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The origins of criminal forfeiture can be traced to the common
law of England.' It is accomplished through an in personam pro-
ceeding whereby a defendant's property is subjected to forfeiture
as a penalty upon conviction of a crime.' The development and
I W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *299. Early England utilized criminal forfeiture
.when a defendant was found guilty of treason or a felony. Id. It was believed that "all
property [was] derived from society," therefore if "a member of any national community
violate[d] the fundamental contract of his association, by transgressing the municipal law,
he forfeit[ed] his right to such privileges as he claim[ed] by that contract .... " Id. See S.
RFP. No. 1030, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS
3182, 3376 [hereinafter 1984 SENATE REPORT]; Brickey, Forfeiture of Attorneys' Fees: The
Impact of RICO and CCE Forfeitures On The Right To Counsel, 72 VA. L. REv. 493, 493 n.1
(1986).
In 1790, the First Congress outlawed criminal forfeiture. Act of April 30, 1790, ch. 9, §
24, 1 Stat. 112, 117; HR. REP. No. 1549, 91st Cong., Ist Sess. 188, reprinted in 1970 U.S.
CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 4007, 4083 [hereinafter 1970 HousE REPORT]. See Note, Bane
of American Forfeiture Law - Banished At Last?, 62 CORNELL L. REV. 768, 795 n.160 and ac-
companying text (1977). Only once between 1790 and 1970 did Congress provide for for-
feiture by statute. See Confiscation Act, 37th Cong., 2d Sess., ch. 195, § 5, 12 Stat. 589,
590 (1862). It gave to the President of the United States the authority to seize the life
estates of Confederate soldiers. Id. The Confiscation Act of 1862 was considered constitu-
tional by the United States Supreme Court in Bigelow v. Forest, 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 339, 352
(1869), and Miller v. United States, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 268, 268 (1870). Hughes &
O'Connell, In Personam (Criminal) Forfeiture and Federal Drug Felonies: An Expansion of a
Harsh English Tradition into a Modern Dilemma, 11 PEPPERDINE L. REV. 613, 619-20 (1984)
(history of in personam forfeiture and discussion of Confiscation Act of 1862).
1 1984 SENATE REPORT, supra note 1, at 3376. "[Cjriminal forfeiture is in personam: it
operates against a convicted criminal defendant." United States v. Nichols, 841 F.2d 1485,
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use of criminal forfeiture in the United States has flourished re-
cently due to a perceived need to combat an increase in criminal
activity.' Two of the most comprehensive federal criminal forfei-
ture provisions are found in the Racketeering Influenced and Cor-
rupt Organizations (RICO) and Continuing Criminal Enterprise
(CCE) statutes.'
1486 (10th Cir. 1988). See United States v. Conner, 752 F.2d 566, 576 (1 1th Cir. 1985)
(forfeiture of defendants' money was in personam), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 821 (1986); United
States v. Long, 654 F.2d 911, 914 (3d Cir. 1981) (criminal forfeiture proceedings under
CCE are in personam); Brickey, supra note 1, at 494-95 nn.6-7 ("[C]riminal forfeitures oper-
ate in personam against the defendant upon conviction of a crime."); Note, supra note 1, at
796 (section 1963 proceeding is in personam) (quoting S. REP. No. 617, 91st Cong., 1st Sess.
7980 (1969)).
Civil forfeiture, on the other hand, is an in rem action. Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht
Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 682 (1974). Whether the defendant is innocent or guilty is of
no consequence because the action operates against the property itself, not the person. Id.
at 683-86.
" See generally 1970 HousE REPORT, supra note 1, at 4083; 1984 SENATE REPORT, supra
note 1, at 3376-77. In 1970, after a long period of holding criminal forfeiture illegal, with
one exception, Congress enacted the original RICO and CCE statutes. See Hughes &
O'Connell, supra note 1, at 621 (Congress' intent to attack economic base of criminal activ-
ity). See also United States v. Martino, 681 F.2d 952, 957 (5th Cir. 1982) (RICO and CCE
employed as both deterrent and penalty).
18 U.S.C.A. §§ 1 9 6 1-to-1968 (West Supp. 1987) comprise the RICO statutes. The
RICO forfeiture provisions are contained primarily in 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 1963(a) and 1963(c).
§ 1963(a) provides:
Whoever violates any provision of section 1962 of this chapter shall be fined not
more than $25,000 or imprisoned not more than twenty years, or both, and shall
forfeit to the United States, irrespective of any provision of State law-(l) any interest
the person has acquired or maintained in violation of section 1962; (2) any- (A) in-
terest in; (B) security of; (C) claim against; or (D) property or contractual right of
any kind affording a source of influence over; any enterprise which the person has
established, operated, controlled, conducted, or participated in the conduct of, in
violation of section 1962; and (3) any property constituting, or derived from, any
proceeds which the person obtained, directly or indirectly, from racketeering activ-
ity or unlawful debt collection in violation of section 1962.
Id.
§ 1963(c) provides:
All right, title, and interest in property described in subsection (a) vests in the
United States upon the commission of the act giving rise to forfeiture under this section.
Any such property that is subsequently transferred to a person other than the de-
fendant may be the subject of a special verdict of forfeiture and thereafter shall be
ordered forfeited to the United States, unless the transferee establishes in a hearing
pursuant to subsection (1) that he is a bona fide purchaser for value of such property
who at the time of purchase was reasonably without cause to believe that the prop-
erty was subject to forfeiture under this section.
Id. (emphasis added).
The CCE statutes are represented by 21 U.S.C.A. §§ 848-853 (West Supp. 1988). The
CCE forfeiture provisions are contained primarily in 21 U.S.C.A. §§ 853(a) and 853(c).
§ 853 (a) provides:
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In their original form, the forfeiture provisions contained "limi-
tations and ambiguities" which rendered them essentially ineffec-
tive, since criminal defendants were able to transfer their assets to
third parties before conviction.' Additionally, the government
failed to aggressively pursue forfeiture. In an attempt to remedy
this ineffectiveness Congress enacted the Comprehensive Forfei-
Any person convicted of a violation of this subchapter or subchapter II of this chap-
ter punishable by imprisonment for more than year shall forfeit to the United
States, irrespective of any provision of State law- (1) any property constituting, or
derived from, any proceeds the person obtained, directly or indirectly, as the result
of such violation; (2) any of the person's property used, or intended to be used, in
any manner or part, to commit, or to facilitate the commission of, such violation;
and (3) in the case of a person convicted of engaging in a continuing criminal enter-
prise in violation of section 848 of this title, the person shall forfeit, in addition to
any property described in paragraph (1) or (2), any of his interest in, claims against,




All right, title, and interest in property described in subsection (a) of this section
vests in the United States upon the commission of the act giving rise to forfeiture under
this section. Any such property that is subsequently transferred to a person other
than the defendant may be the subject of a special verdict of forfeiture and thereaf-
ter shall be ordered forfeited to the United States, unless the transferee establishes
in a hearing pursuant to subsection (n) of this section that he is a bona fide pur-
chaser for value of such property who at the time of purchase was reasonably with-
out cause to believe that the property was subject to forfeiture under this section.
Id. (emphasis added).
"Congress first acted to provide for criminal forfeiture when it passed [RICO and
CCE]." 1984 SENATE REPORT, supra note 1, at 3376. See Note, supra note 1, at 794-95
("Congress thought it was providing for the first use of forfeiture as criminal punishment
since the first Congress abolished the common law forfeitures .... ").
RICO sought to "stymie organized crime's growing infiltration of legitimate business."
1970 HousE REPORT, supra note 1, at 4081. CCE aimed at "punish(ing] and tak[ing] out of
circulation persons who were engaged in the manufacture and sale of drugs primarily for
the profits to be derived therefrom." United States v. Jeffers, 532 F.2d 1101, 1110 (7th
Cir. 1976), afd in part & vacated in part, on other grounds, 432 U.S. 137, reh'g denied, 434
U.S. 880 (1977).
6 See 1984 SENATE REPORT, supra note 1, at 3374 (citing Asset Forfeiture - A Seldom Used
Tool in Combatting Drug Trafficking, General Accounting Office Release (April 10, 1981)).
The GAO release concluded that the results of the RICO and CCE provisions, 18 U.S.C.A.
§ 1963(c) and 21 U.S.C.A. § 853(c) respectively, were "far below Congress' expectations."
Id. Reasons given for the ineffectiveness of the forfeiture provisions were, (1) lack of ag-
gressive pursuit on the part of government agents, and (2) "that the current forfeiture
statutes contain[ed] numerous limitations and ambiguities that have significantly impeded
the full realization of forfeiture's potential as a powerful law enforcement weapon." Id. See
also United States v. Nichols, 841 F.2d 1485, 1487 (10th Cir. 1988) ("Despite the new
provisions, the drug problem continued unabated."); Hughes & O'Connell, supra note 1, at
621 (non administrative loopholes existed).
See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
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ture Act of 1984 (CFA).7
To further its intention of stripping organized crime of its eco-
nomic power, Congress enacted a "relation back" provision, via
the CFA, which made the application of forfeiture more effective
by vesting title to a convicted criminal defendant's ill gotten assets
in the United States at the commission of the crime charged
rather than at conviction.' Thus, criminal forfeiture has become a
more powerful weapon for the government to utilize in its fight
against organized crime because a transfer of tainted assets by a
criminal defendant will be invalid unless it is shown that the trans-
feree was a bona fide purchaser for value.'
7 21 U.S.C.A. § 853 (West 1985).
'See United States v. Monsanto, 836 F.2d 74, 78 (2d Cir. 1987), affd, 852 F.2d 1400 (2d
Cir.), cert. granted, 57 U.S.L.W. 3333 (U.S. Nov. 8, 1988) (No. 88-454). "It is clear that
Congress, in enacting the CFA, intended to close a loophole in the previous criminal forfei-
ture scheme that had allowed defendants to evade forfeiture by means of third party trans-
fers prior to conviction." Id.; United States v. lanniello, 644 F. Supp. 452, 455-56
(S.D.N.Y. 1985). "[F]orfeiture authority was designed to strip... offenders and organiza-
tions of their economic power." 1984 SENATE REPORT, supra note 1, at 3374. Only those
assets to be transferred as part of a "sham or artifice" are to be forfeited. United States v.
Rogers, 602 F. Supp. 1332, 1347 (D. Colo. 1985). See also supra note 4 for the relevant
text of 18 U.S.C.A. § 1963(c) and 21 U.S.C.A. § 853(c); United States v. Bassett, 632 F.
Supp. 1308, 1316 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) ("[T]he true impact [of forfeiture] is felt prior to con-
viction" because of the relation back provision).
' United States v. Cauble, 706 F.2d 1322, 1346 (5th Cir. 1983) (remedy for innocent
parties affected by forfeiture restrictions is to petition Attorney General for "remission or
mitigation of the forfeiture"), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1005 (1984); Weiner, Crime Must Not
Pay: RICO Criminal Forfeiture in Perspective, 1 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 225, 228 n.13 (1980) (forfei-
ture restrictions only directed at defendant's interest; jury's special verdict will take cogni-
zance of innocent party interests); Tarlow, RICO: The New Darling of the Prosecutor's Nursery,
49 FORDHAm L. Rzv. 165, 287-89 (1980) (discussion of rights of innocent parties when they
share interest in forfeitable property with RICO defendant). But see United States v.
L'Hoste, 609 F.2d 796, 812 (5th Cir. 1980) (concern for innocent persons "does not re-
quire the erosion of the directive nature of section 1963's language"), cert. denied, 449 U.S.
833 (1980).
Prior to the amendments to RICO and CCE, Congress felt that "the serious problem of
a defendant's pretrial disposition of his assets" was not properly dealt with and that it was
necessary to preserve those assets for forfeiture. 1984 SENATE REPORT, supra note 1, at
3379. Providing for "relation back" in criminal forfeiture would work to void sham or
fraudulent "pre-conviction transfers" to third parties. Id.
Another feature of the forfeiture provisions is that a defendant cannot escape forfeiture
by simply transferring his tainted assets to third parties before conviction unless the third
party establishes that he is a bona fide purchaser for value. See United States v. Ginsburg,
773 F.2d 798, 801 (7th Cir. 1985) (government's interest does not attach until conviction,
but title vests upon commission), cert denied, 475 U.S. 1101 (1986); United States v. Nich-
ols, 654 F. Supp 1541, 1546 (D. Utah 1987) (CCE forfeiture provisions of § 853 provide
for protection of bona fide purchasers of defendants' property through post conviction
procedures), rev'd on other grounds, 841 F.2d 1485 (10th Cir. 1988) (CCE forfeiture provi-
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The new amendments to the forfeiture provisions have been
controversial. 10 Courts have not uniformly interpreted the appli-
cation of the CFA's provisions to the forfeiture of attorneys'
fees."1 In earlier cases courts used the statutes' legislative history
in their analyses. 12 Scrutiny of the legislative history has generally
led courts to conclude that the forfeiture provisions of the CFA
were not intended to reach attorneys' fees, unless the fee transac-
tion was fraudulent or a sham.1" In later cases, courts have relied
on the CFA's plain meaning rather than its congressional history
and have come to the conclusion that the forfeiture provisions
also encompass attorneys' fees."' The courts which have con-
sions of section 853 provide for protection of bona fide purchasers of defendant's property
through post-conviction procedures); Comment, Criminal Foreiture and the Attorney-Client
Relationship: Are Attorneys' Fees Up For Grabs?, 39 Sw. L.J. 1067, 1076 (1986) ("if a defend-
ant sells tainted property for value to a bona fide purchaser ... the transfer will stand").
'o See Comment, supra note 9, at 1076 n.73 and accompanying text.
"See United States v. Harvey, 814 F.2d 905, 909-13 (4th Cir. 1987). The court recog-
nized the expanded power of the government provided by the Comprehensive Forfeiture
Act, yet realized the exact scope of such power was uncertain. Id. See also United States v.
Monsanto, 836 F.2d 74, 78-79 (2d Cir. 1987) (split in courts on exemption of legitimate
attorneys' fees from forfeiture), affd, 852 F.2d 1400 (2d cir.), cert. granted, 57 U.S.L.W.
3333 (U.S. Nov. 8, 1988) (No. 88-454); Note, infra note 36, at 830 (scope of issues brought
up in RICO cases involving attorney fee forfeiture has varied widely, resulting in contro-
versy to whether attorneys' fees are forfeitable); Note, Forfeitability of Attorney's Fees Tracea-
ble As Proceeds From A RICO Violation Under The Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, 32
WAYNE L. REv. 1499, 1509 (1986) (courts disagree as to whether attorneys' fees are forfeit-
able as proceeds of the crime).
" Compare United States v. Estevez, 645 F. Supp. 869, 872 (E.D. Wis. 1986) (relying on
legislative intent in finding that attorneys' fees from non-fraudulent transactions were ex-
empt from forfeiture) and United States v. Figueroa, 645 F. Supp. 453, 456 (W.D. Pa.
1986) (comporting with legislative intent by finding legitimate attorneys' fees exempt from
forfeiture) with United States v. Caplin & Drysdale, 837 F.2d 637, 641-43 (4th Cir. 1988)(court did not examine legislative intent) and United States v. Monsanto, 836 F.2d 74, 78
(2d Cir. 1987) (plain language of statute provided no exemption from forfeiture for attor-
neys' fees), affd, 852 F.2d 1400 (2d cir.), cert. granted, 57 U.S.L.W. 3333 (U.S. Nov. 8,
1988) (No. 88-454).
3 See United States v. lanniello, 644 F. Supp. 452, 455-56 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (scant legisla-
tive history proved that legitimate attorneys' fees were not subject to forfeiture unless con-
nected with scheme or fraud); United States v. Badalamenti, 614 F. Supp. 194, 196(S.D.N.Y. 1985) (legislative history indicated that attorneys' fees were not encompassed by
statute); United States v. Rogers, 602 F. Supp. 1332, 1348 (D. Colo. 1985) (court looked to
legislative history to determine that legitimate attorneys' fees were exempt from forfei-
ture).
'4 United States v. Monsanto, 836 F.2d 74, 79 (2d Cir. 1987) (Act's clear and plain mean-
ing should control), affd, 852 F.2d 1400 (2d Cir.), cert. granted, 57 U.S.L.W. 3333 (U.S.
Nov. 8, 1988) (No. 88-454); United States v. Harvey, 814 F.2d 905, 913 (4th Cir. 1987)(statutory interpretation begins and ends with statute when language is clear and unambig-
uous), rev'd on rehearing sub nom. United States v. Caplin & Drysdale, 837 F.2d 637 (4th
119
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cluded that the language of the CFA is clear and unambiguous
have found themselves confronted with constitutional challenges
to the CFA's provisions.1 '
This Article will address the constitutional implications associ-
ated with attorney fee forfeiture under the CFA. First, sixth
amendment considerations will be discussed. Second, the ethical
problems arising from attorney fee forfeiture will be addressed.
Finally, this Article will discuss fifth amendment due process viola-
tions inherent in the forfeiture provisions of the Act.
I. SixTH AMENDMENT CONSIDERATIONS
The sixth amendment to the United States Constitution guaran-
tees criminal defendants the right to effective assistance of coun-
sel."6 It is submitted that the forfeiture provisions of the CFA
have been construed in a manner which directly undermines this
right. Courts' reliance on the existence of public defenders' of-
Cir. 1988). See generally Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 20 (1983) (if language of
statute is unambiguous, scrutiny of legislative history is precluded unless literal language
would contravene clearly expressed legislative intention); United States v. Turkette, 452
U.S. 576, 580 (1981). "If the statutory language is unambiguous, in the absence of 'a
clearly expressed legislative intent to the contrary, that language must ordinarily be re-
garded as conclusive.'" Id. (quoting Consumer Product Safety Comm'n v. GTE Sylvania,
Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 108 (1980)).
13 See Monsanto, 836 F.2d at 80 (no constitutional clash even though attorneys' fees fall
under the Act); Harvey, 814 F.2d at 931 (defendant's deprivation of property used for at-
torneys' fees violated due process and sixth amendment right to counsel). Since the initial
circuit court panel opinion, the case was reheard en bane and the Fourth Circuit reversed,
holding that there was no sixth amendment violation, thus illustrating the vacillating opin-
ions over such forfeitures. See United States v. Caplin & Drysdale, 837 F.2d 637, 643 (4th
Cir. 1988) ("forfeiture of attorney's fees poses no threat whatsoever to the absolute right
to be represented by counsel").
"* U.S. CONST. amend. VI. The sixth amendment provides in part that "in all criminal
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to... have the Assistance of Counsel for his
Defence." Id.
Although the language of the sixth amendment does not specifically set forth that there
should be "effective" assistance of counsel, it has been construed as requiring such. See
McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 n.14 (1970) ("right to counsel is the right to
effective assistance .... "). See also United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 654 (1984) (text
of amendment implies right to effective counsel); Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668,
686 (1984) (same); Cloud, Forfeting Defense Attorneys' Fees: Applying An Institutional Role The-
ory To Define Individual Constitutional Rights, 1987 Wis. L. REV. 1, 4 (1987) (defense counsel
must "provide effective representation"); Note, Against Forfeiture of Attorneys' Fees Under
RICO: Protecting the Constitutional Rights of Criminal Defendants, 61 N.Y.U. L. REv. 124, 140
(1986) (right to counsel means effective assistance).
Attorney Fee Forfeiture
ficest7 , the Criminal Justice Act (CJA)'8 and caselaw involving for-
feiture pursuant to jeopardy tax assessmentst has led to the pre-
sumption of constitutionally valid forfeiture of attorneys' fees. It is
suggested that such reliance is misplaced in the light of the serious
sixth amendment concerns which remain.
Most public defenders' offices lack the economic resources and
specialized staff required to adequately represent a defendant in a
complex RICO or CCE trial."0 Moreover, where there are multi-
17 See, e.g., United States v. Caplin & Drysdale, 837 F.2d 637, 643 (4th Cir. 1988) (sixth
amendment has come to mean representation for defendant either by retained or ap-
pointed counsel). See also United States v. Curcio, 680 F.2d 881, 890 (2d Cir. 1982) (noting
right to counsel is constitutional right, yet right to counsel of choice is not absolute right);
United States v. Ostrer, 597 F.2d 337, 341 (2d Cir. 1979) (defendant's right to counsel of
choice is not absolute).
18 U.S.C.A. § 3006A (West Supp. 1988). The CJA is a plan for furnishing court ap-
pointed counsel to criminal defendants who are financially unable to obtain attorneys. Id.
at § 3006A(a). The CJA sets caps on appointed counsel's hourly rate, and the overall
amount receivable in a case. Id. at § 3006A(d)(2). The hourly rate is not to exceed $60 per
hour for time in court, and $40 per hour for time spent outside of court, if it is reasonable,
and a maximum of $75 per hour. Id. at § 3006A(dX1). The maximum amount to be re-
ceived for a case taken under CJA is $3,500 for each attorney if the case involves at least
one felony, and $1,000 each if only misdemeanors are charged. Id. at § 3006A(d)(2). Maxi-
mum amounts may be waived by the court if deemed necessary. Id. at § 3006A(dX3). See
also Caplin & Dysdale, 837 F.2d at 650 (Murnaghan, J., concurring) (CJA rates may be
inadequate); Cloud, supra note 16, at 48-49 and accompanying footnotes.
It is unlikely that an experienced and competent attorney would represent a defendant
in such a case, potentially for several months, for a mere $3,500. See United States v. Rog-
ers, 602 F. Supp. 1332, 1350 (1985) (appointing counsel three to four months before
RICO/CFA trial is inadequate and gives government unfair tactical advantage).
It has been suggested that the federal courts should develop a compensation system com-
parable to that of England, wherein courts will pay an attorney 90% of the fees charged
against his indigent client. See Tague, An Indigent's Right to the Attorney of His Choice, 27
STAN. L. REv. 73, 89 n.94 (1974) (citing R. JACKSON, THE MACHINERY OF JUSTICE IN ENG-
LAND 174-90 (1940)). Cf. United States v. Nichols, 841 F.2d 1485, 1505 (10th Cir. 1988)
(no sixth amendment violation when Criminal Forfeiture Act used, as defendant can pay
for counsel from legitimate sources or have counsel appointed); United States v. Reck-
meyer, 631 F. Supp. 1191, 1196-97 (E.D. Va. 1986) (forfeiture of attorneys' fees under
CJA, RICO or CCE realistically precludes possibility of private counsel because of fee ceil-
ings under acts; government therefore denies defendant's choice of counsel), rev'd on re-
hearing sub nora. United States v. Caplin & Drysdale, 837 F.2d 637 (4th Cir. 1988).
1.R.C. § 6861(a) (1982). See infra note 28 and accompanying text; United States v.
Marshall, 526 F.2d 1349, 1353-54 (9th Cir. 1975) (strong policy against judicial interfer-
ence with tax collection process; no prevention of choice of counsel as defendant did not
assert interest in money equal to government's), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 923 (1976). See also
Summers v. United States, 250 F.2d 132, 134 (9th Cir. 1957) (that money seized under
assessment would have been used to hire accountant to assist counsel does not amount to
denial of "effective counsel").
" See United States v. Ianniello, 644 F. Supp. 452, 456 (S.D.N.Y. 1985). Because RICO
prosecutions involve such complex litigation, public defender offices do not have the neces-
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pie defendants in the same action, conflicts of interest would bar
the same public defender's office from representing more than
one co-conspirator."1 Inevitably, the remaining defendant or de-
fendants who could not receive representation through the public
defender's office would be forced to seek private counsel at a com-
pensation level set by the CJA."
Alternatively, courts have relied on the existence of the CJA in
RICO and CCE cases as a means of providing competent counsel
in satisfaction of the sixth amendment."3 However, the limited
sary resources to handle them competently. Id. See also United States v. Rogers, 602 F.
Supp. 1332, 1349 (D. Colo. 1985) ("The costs of mounting a defense of an indictment
under RICO are far beyond the resources or expertise of the average federal public de-
fender's office ...."); United States v. Veon, 538 F. Supp. 237, 248 (E.D. Cal. 1982)
("CCE cases are viewed as the most complex in federal criminal law"); Cloud, supra note
16, at 47 ("The harsh reality is that appointed counsel is probably inadequate for lengthy
and complex RICO and CCE cases."); cf. Portman, Financing Your Right to Counsel: A View
From A Local Public Defender, 19 Loy. L.A.L. REV. 363, 365 (1985) (public defender offices
are too overworked and understaffed for their lawyers to do their work properly); Note,
Forfeiture of Attorneys' Fees: Should Defendants Be Allowed to Retain the "Rolls Royce of Attor-
neys" with the "Fruits of the Crime?", 39 STAN. L. REV. 663, 675 (1987) (RICO and CCE cases
are complex).
" See Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 345-50 (1980); Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S.
475, 488-91 (1978). "[Tlhe Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel en-
compasses the right to representation by an attorney who does not owe conflicting duties
to other defendants." Cuyler, 446 U.S. at 351 (Brennan, J., concurring in part) (citing Hol-
loway, 435 U.S. at 488-89). See also Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 76 (1942) (requir-
ing attorney to represent two codefendants who have conflicting interests in same case
denies one of them his sixth amendment right to effective assistance of counsel); Cloud,
supra note 16, at 48 n.228 and accompanying text ("conflicts of interest among multiple
defendants require that a single public defender's office may not represent them all").
" Cloud, supra note 16, at 48. It follows that if a criminal defendant is unable to obtain
representation from a public defender's office, he will have to find it elsewhere. Id. Unless
the defendant has assets separate and apart from those subject to forfeiture, the only re-
maining source of compensation for a private attorney is the CJA. Id.
,See, e.g., United States v. Monsanto, 836 F.2d 74 (2d Cir. 1987), affd, 852 F.2d 1400
(2d Cir.), cert. granted, 57 U.S.L.W. 3333 (U.S. Nov. 8, 1988) (No. 88-454). In effect, Mon-
santo presumed that the CJA enables a RICO or CCE defendant to retain counsel of his
choice, "thus, minimizing the incursion upon the defendant's limited right to counsel of
choice." Id. at 85. See generally United States v. Bello, 470 F. Supp. 723, 725 (S.D. Cal.
1979) (court appointed counsel deprives defendant of his attorney of choice).
It has been said that the deprivation of a defendant's choice of counsel is as unconstitu-
tional as deprivation of his right to counsel. See United States v. Burton, 584 F.2d 485,
488-89 (D.C. Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1069 (1979). "An essential element of the
Sixth Amendment's protection of the right to the assistance of counsel is that a defendant
must be afforded reasonable opportunity to secure counsel of his own choice." Id. See also
United States v. Rogers, 602 F. Supp. 1332, 1349 (D. Colo. 1985) (appointment of counsel
under CJA "pays no more than lip service to due process and the right to counsel"). But see
Brickey, supra note 1, at 519 ("some courts will be satisfied that the availability of ap-
pointed counsel adequately neutralizes the sixth amendment objections raised by
Attorney Fee Forfeiture
compensation provided under CJA would probably be insufficient
to attract attorneys who are equipped to handle such complex liti-
gation." The CJA fee schedule has been described as "niggardly"
and criticized as apt to attract only attorneys of limited experience
and ability. 5 By contrast, the government's case is presented by
an experienced prosecution team supplied with substantial finan-
cial reserves and assisted by federal and state investigatory and law
enforcement personnel." Therefore, an "adequate defense" as
promised by the Constitution, is unlikely to be mounted. 7
Courts have also analogized the RICO and CCE forfeiture pro-
visions to those of jeopardy tax assessment cases to support the
contention that fee forfeiture does not offend the sixth amend-
ment.28 Jeopardy tax assessments are utilized in the government's
defendants .... ").
" See supra note 18 (discussion of CJA).
s Cloud, supra note 16, at 48-49. Professor Cloud bases this theory on language con-
tained in United States v. Reckmeyer, 631 F. Supp. 1191, 1197 (E.D. Va. 1985), aff d
nom. United States v. Harvey, 814 F.2d 905 (4th Cir. 1987), rev'd on other grounds sub nom.
In re Caplin & Drysdale, 837 F.2d 637 (4th Cir. 1988) (en banc). See also supra note 18 and
accompanying text (compensation provided under CJA wholly inadequate to attract compe-
tent counsel).
se Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963). "Governments, both state and fed-
eral .... spend vast sums of money to establish machinery to try defendants accused of
crime." Id.; Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 19 (1956) ("There can be no equal justice
where the kind of trial a man gets depends on the amount of money he has."); ABA Pro-
ject on Standards for Criminal Justice, Providing Defense Services, 1 (1968) (Society's goal
should be "that the system for providing counsel and facilities for the defense be as good as
the system which society provides for the prosecution.").
", See supra notes 20, 24 & 25 and accompanying text; Nutt v. United States, 335 F.2d
817, 818 (10th Cir.) (sixth amendment means effective assistance "as distinguished from
bad faith, sham, pretense, or lack of opportunity for conference and preparation"), cert.
denied, 379 U.S. 909 (1964); J. Casper, Criminal Courts: The Defendant's Perspective ii (1978).
"Nearly 30% of the defendants who had public defenders reported that their attorney
spent less than 10 minutes with them; 32% stated 10-29 minutes; 27% stated 1/2 hour to 3
hours; and only 14% stated more than 3 hours ..... Id. In view of these findings, it is not
surprising that nearly half (49%) of all public defenders' clients thought their attorney was
'on the side of the state." Id.
" See, e.g., Caplin & Diysdale, 837 F.2d at 646; Brickey, supra note 1, at 525-29. See also
Brief for Appellee at 41-42, United States v. Monsanto, 836 F.2d 74 (2d Cir. 1987) (anal-
ogy to jeopardy tax assessment to justify forfeiture). But see Tarlow, Criminal Defendants
And Abuse of Jeopardy Tax Procedures, 22 UCLA L. REV. 1191, 1217-18 (1975) (significant
constitutional problems arise from immediate seizure of assets which impact on defendant's
right to fair trial).
Black's Law Dictionary defines "jeopardy assessment" as follows:
If the collection of a tax appears in question, the IRS may assess and collect the tax
immediately without the usual formalities. Also, the IRS has the power to terminate
a taxpayer's taxable year before the usual date if it feels that the collection of the tax
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effort to raise revenues by forfeiting the property of one against
whom a tax has already been assessed." Conversely, the criminal
forfeiture provisions used by the government in its fight against
crime attach before the conviction or indictment."0 It is submitted
that the RICO and CCE forfeiture provisions are not analogous to
jeopardy tax assessments, as the purposes and effects of each are
distinct.
Effective assistance of counsel is a right conferred by the consti-
tution aimed toward protecting a criminal defendant's liberty in-
terest."' It is well established in the law of the United States that a
higher standard of proof is required when depriving one of his
liberty rather than his property interest." Some courts, however,
have merely required proof by a preponderance of the evidence
in pre-trial hearings where the issue of forfeiture is decided." It is
suggested that forfeiture of attorneys' fees bears upon the crimi-
nal defendant's liberty interest to such an extent that the highest
standard of proof, proof beyond a reasonable doubt, should apply.
may be in peril because the taxpayer plans to leave the country.
BLAc 's LAW DICTIONARY 749 (5th ed. 1979).
"The jeopardy assessment procedure permits the IRS, when it believes that assessment
or collection of a tax currently due and payable would be 'jeopardized by delay,' to assess
the tax immediately." Brickey, supra note 1, at 525 (citing I.R.C. § 6861(a) (1982)).
"Cloud, supra note 16, at 40 n.189 (citing Blumenfield v. United States, 306 F.2d 892,
900 (8th Cir. 1962)) (jeopardy tax assessments utilized to further the government's purpose
of raising revenues via taxation).
" See supra notes 2-4 & 8-9 and accompanying text (purpose behind criminal forfeiture
provisions is to provide weapon for government's fight against crime). See also Note, supra
note 16, at 138 n.77 (forfeiture cases' reliance on tax cases is wrong because the govern-
ment's interest in the two are distinct).
" See supra note 16 and accompanying text (sixth amendment guarantees to a criminal
defendant the right to "effective" assistance of counsel). To deny a defendant his right to
the effective assistance of counsel violates the sixth amendment guarantee. See Cronic, 466
U.S. at 657-62; Strickland, 466 U.S. at 692; Gideon v. Wainright, 372 U.S. 335, 344
(1963). "[I]n our adversary system of criminal justice, any person haled into court who is
too poor to hire a lawyer cannot be assured a fair trial unless counsel is provided for him."
Id. "[N]o person may be deprived of his liberty who has been denied the assistance of
counsel as guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment." Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 37-
38 (1972) (quoting Stevenson v. Holzman, 254 Ore. 94, 102, 458 P.2d 414, 418 (1969)).
See also Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 373-74 (1979) (sixth and fourteenth amendments
mandate that criminal indigent cannot be incarcerated if state has not provided counsel in
his defense).
" See infra note 65 and accompanying text (where defendant's life or liberty is threat-
ened, proof beyond a reasonable doubt must be used to avoid error).
" See infra notes 65-68 and accompanying text (preponderance standard used by some
courts at pre-trial hearings).
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In sum, it is asserted that courts which have relied on the exis-
tence of public defenders' offices and court appointed counsel to
fulfill the effective assistance guarantee or which have analogized
jeopardy tax assessments to RICO and CCE forfeiture have failed
to fully protect criminal defendants' sixth amendment rights. Un-
less the transaction is fraudulent, the RICO and CCE statutes
should be construed to except from forfeiture legitimate attor-
neys' fees to avoid all potential constitutional infirmities."
II. ETHICAL CONCERNS OF ATTORNEY FEE FORFEITURE
Contingency fee arrangements in criminal cases are void as a-
gainst public policy.3' It is suggested that some courts would have
RICO and CCE defense attorneys face an ethical problem by
maintaining that attorneys' fees may be subject to forfeiture. If
attorneys' fees are forfeitable under RICO and CCE the defend-
ant's attorney will have a pecuniary interest in the outcome of the
case because his compensation would be dependent upon his suc-
cess." This situation could lead to conflicts; the potential for
"See United States v. lanniello, 644 F. Supp. 452, 455-56 (S.D.N.Y. 1985). The court
noted that bona-fide attorney's fees paid to counsel who serve defendant's needs were not
intended by Congress to be forfeitable. Id. Such fees were not paid as part of a sham or
merely so that defendant could avoid forfeiture. Id. at 456; United States v. Rogers, 602 F.
Supp. 1332, 1348 (D. Colo. 1985) 602 F. Supp. 1332, 1348. The court stated that "an
attorney who receives funds in return for services legitimately rendered operates at arm's
length and not as part of an artifice or sham to avoid forfeiture." Id. See also Cloud, supra
note 16, at 31 (if government can show funds paid to attorney were for fraudulent pur-
poses, neither defendant nor defense counsel can claim legitimate interest in transaction,
nor is there any sixth amendment interest deserving protection); Note, supra note 11, at
1499 (pre-trial hearing should be provided in determining whether attorneys' fees should
be forfeitable); DFPr. OF JusTic, U.S. ATTORNEYS' MANUAL § 9-111.410. "Forfeiture of an
asset transferred to an attorney as fees for legal services may be pursued where there are
reasonable grounds to believe that the transfer is a fraudulent or sham transaction
designed to shield from forfeiture assets which otherwise are forfeitable." Id.
" MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-106(c) n.3 (1980). See also
Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of the Supreme Court of Ohio, 471 U.S. 626,
670 (1985) (criminal contingent fee is a violation of disciplinary rules); Nolan v. Foreman,
665 F.2d 738, 741 n.5 (5th Cir. 1982) (quoting DR 2-106) ("A lawyer shall not enter into
an arrangement for, charge, or collect a contingent fee for representing a defendant in a
criminal case."); Cloud, supra note 16, at 63 (violation for attorney to take criminal case on
contingency fee basis); Note, Forfeiture of Attorneys' Fees Under RICO and CCE, 54 FORDHAM
L. Rv. 1171, 1181 (1986) (same).
" See Caplin & Dvysdale, 837 F.2d at 642-43 (if defendant prevails, assets will be available
to pay legal fees); lanniello, 644 F. Supp. at 457 (defendant's attorney may be viewed as
having accepted criminal contingent fee); Note, Forefeiture of Attorneys' Fees: A Trap For The
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which would warrant a new trial."'
Avoidance of many of these ethical problems may be accom-
plished by interpreting the forfeiture provisions of RICO and
CCE as exempting attorneys' fees. It would also be less problemat-
ical for the government to forego those assets which potentially
are forfeitable than it is for an attorney to have to face ethical
charges.
III. FIFTH AMENDMENT CONSIDERATIONS
The fifth amendment to the Constitution guarantees that no
person shall be forced to give up life, liberty, or property without
due process of law." Under the forfeiture provisions of the RICO
and CCE statutes defendants may be deprived of the use of their
property pursuant to pre- or post-indictment restraining orders.'
Unwary, 88 W. VA. L. REv. 825, 844 (1986) (payment depends on outcome). See also MODEL
CODE OF PROFESSIONAL REsPoNsIBILrrY DR 5-103, EC 5-7 (1980) (criminal attorney may not
acquire financial interest in case's outcome).-
" See Simon v. Murphy, 349 F. Supp. 818, 824 (E.D. Pa. 1972) (citing Miller v. Myers,
253 F. Supp. 55, 57 (E.D. Pa. 1966)). Only a showing of conflict need be shown, not actual
prejudice. Id. See also lanniello, 644 F. Supp. at 457 (potential for attorney to put his inter-
ests before his client's); Badalamenti, 614 F. Supp. at 196-97 (attorney may plea bargain in
order to minimize risk of forfeiture); Comment, The 1984 RICO Amendments: Will Defend-
ants and their Attorneys be Short-Changed?, 18 PAC L.J. 31, 55 (1986) (forfeiture logically
leads to increased plea bargaining). Cf. Note, supra note 36, at 844-45 (attorney in "Catch-
22" position of ensuring payment by guilty plea which may be ethically unsound).
" U.S. CONST. amend. V. The fifth amendment provides: "No person shall be deprived of
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law ... ." Id.
' 18 U.S.C.A. § 1963 (d)(1)(A),(B) (West Supp. 1987). The RICO statute provides:
Upon application of the United States, the court may enter a restraining order or
injunction, require the execution of a satisfactory performance bond, or take any
other action to preserve the availability of property described in subsection (a) for
forfeiture under this section- (A) upon the filing of an indictment or information
charging a violation of section 1962 of this chapter and alleging that the property
with respect to which the order is sought would, in the event of conviction, be sub-
ject to forfeiture under this section; or (B) prior to the filing of such an indictment
of information, if, after notice to persons appearing to have an interest in the prop-
erty and opportunity for a hearing, the court determines that- (i) there is a substan-
tial probability that the United States will prevail on the issue of forfeiture and that
failure to enter the order will result in the property being destroyed, removed from
the jurisdiction of the court, or otherwise made unavailable for forfeiture; and (ii)
the need to preserve the availability of the property through the entry of the re-
quested order is to be entered ....
Id.
The forfeiture provision of the CCE is codified at 21 U.S.C.A. § 853 (e)(1)(A), (B) (West
Supp. 1988) and is essentially the same as RICO. See United States v. Jones, 837 F.2d 1332,
1334 (5th Cir. 1988) (the two statutes are identical); United States v. Harvey, 814 F.2d
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Although this attachment may only be temporary if a defendant is
subsequently acquitted,'0 the United States Supreme Court has
determined that even such temporary deprivations of property fall
within the parameters of due process.41
A. Due Process: The Right to a Hearing
Due process is a flexible concept; the adherence to which is ana-
lyzed on an ad hoc basis.' 2 In a case in which a person is being
905, 909 n.l (4th Cir. 1987), rev'd on rehearing sub norn. United States v. Caplin & Drysdale,
837 F.2d 637 (4th Cir. 1988) (RICO and CCE forfeiture provisions are essentially the
same).
Under subdivision (d)(l)(B), if the restraint of property is to occur pre-indictment, a
hearing is required once the restraining order has been issued. 18 U.S.C. § 1963 (West
Supp. 1988). Section (d)(I)(A) which addresses post-indictment forfeiture procedures does
not acknowledge a defendant's entitlement to a post-deprivation hearing. Id.
" See Cloud, supra note 16, at 63. In order for a defendant to actually forfeit assets,
including attorneys' fees, there must be a conviction. Id. Conversely, a verdict of not guilty
will vest the assets in the acquitted defendant. Id. See also United States v. lanniello, 644 F.
Supp. 452, 457 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (because defendant could retain his money upon acquittal,
this is the only time when attorney is assured of receiving his fee).
41 See North Georgia Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., 419 U.S. 601, 606 (1975). The
Court held that the fourteenth amendment due process procedures are required any time
there has been a significant taking of property, and the length of time in which the defend-
ant has been deprived of his property is only relevant to determine what type of proce-
dures will be involved. Id. See also Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 84-85 (1971) (temporary
taking of property is still under purview of fourteenth amendment); Bell v. Burson, 402
U.S. 535, 539 (1971) (temporary suspension of driver's license in accordance with state
statute promoting safety involved questions of due process); Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp.,
395 U.S. 337, 339-42 (1969) (interim taking of wages violates due process if done without a
hearing); Note, RICO Post-Indictment Restraining Orders: The Process Due Defendants, 60
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1162, 1165 (1985) ("The Supreme Court has recognized that temporary...
deprivations of property . . . are deprivations within the meaning of . . . due process
"See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334 (1975). " 'Due process', unlike some legal
rules, is not a technical conception with a fixed content unrelated to time, place and cir-
cumstances." Id. (quoting Cafeteria Workers v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 895 (1961)). The
Mathews court suggested a balancing of the individual interests affected, the procedures
used and government's interest in analyzing due process questions. Id. at 335. See also
United States v. $8,850, 461 U.S. 555, 564 (1983). The Court analogized the test from
Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530 (1972), to determine that because courts approach
speedy trial cases on an ad hoc basis, courts should approach the due process element of
having a hearing within a reasonable time on an ad hoc basis as well. Id.; Arnett v. Ken-
nedy, 416 U.S. 134, 167-68 (1974) (Powell, J., concurring in part) (constitutional proce-
dures require scrutiny of the individual private and governmental interests involved in
each case); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972) (concept of due process is flexi-
ble and procedural safeguards vary with circumstance); United States v. Rogers, 602 F.
Supp. 1332, 1344 (D. Colo. 1985) (same); Comment, RICO and the Forfeiture of Attorneys'
Fees: Removing the Adversary From the Adversarial System, 62 WASH. L. REV. 201, 223-24
(1987) (due process is not a fixed technical conception, but must be shaped around the
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deprived of his property, due process requires both notice' and
an opportunity to be heard."
The right to a hearing prior to deprivation of property 6 is re-
circumstances of each case).
" See Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 80 (1972). The Court noted that it is fundamental
to due process to receive notice of a proceeding within a reasonable time and in a reasgna-
ble manner. Id. See also United States v. Monsanto, 836 F.2d 74, 83 (2d Cir. 1987) (due
process requires notice), affd, 852 F.2d 1400 (2d Cir.), cert. granted, 57 U.S.L.W. 3333
(U.S. Nov. 8, 1988) (No. 88-454); United States v. Harvey, 814 F.2d 905, 928 (4th Cir.
1987) ("[d]ue process requires that a person not be deprived of his property without notice
and opportunity for a hearing"), rev'd on rehearing sub nomn. United States v. Caplin & Drys-
dale, 837 F.2d 637 (4th Cir. 1988); Mullane v. Central Hanover Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306,
314 (1950) (in any proceeding, essential requirement for due process is notice of proceed-
ing given within reasonable time); Grannis v. Ordean, 234 U.S. 385, 394 (1914) (giving
notice to those involved in proceeding constitutes due process within meaning of the four-
teenth amendment).
For purposes of a RICO proceeding, the indictment by the grand jury will suffice to put
the defendant on notice. 1984 SENATE REPORT, supra note 1, at 3386. The Committee for
the Judiciary found that "[t]he indictment ... itself gives notice of the government's inten-
tion to seek forfeiture of the property." Id. See also United States v. Thier, 801 F.2d 1463,
1469 (5th Cir. 1986) (when indictment describes property to be forfeited it satisfies consti-
tutional notice requirements); United States v. Raimondo, 721 F.2d 476, 477 (4th Cir.
1983) (indictment does not have to list every item subject to forfeiture but it will serve as
notice to defendant that government seeks forfeiture). Although the indictment may serve
as notice of the forfeiture to the defendant, the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure re-
quire that "[i]f the indictment or information alleges that an interest or property is subject
to criminal forfeiture, a special verdict shall be returned as to the extent of the interest or
property subject to forfeiture, if any." FED. R. CRIM. P. 3 1(e). See also United States v. Jones,
837 F.2d 1332, 1333 (5th Cir. 1988) (jury determined what property was forfeitable pursu-
ant to RICO statute).
" See Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 81-82 (1972). People whose possessions may be
taken must be afforded an opportunity to be heard. Id. See also Mullane v. Central Hanover
Trust Co., 399 U.S. 306, 314 (1950) ("The fundamental requisite of due process of law is
the opportunity to be heard") (quoting Grannis v. Ordean, 234 U.S. 385, 394 (1913));
Louisville & Nashville R.R. v. Schmidt, 177 U.S. 230, 236 (1900) (same); Simon v. Craft,
182 U.S. 427, 436 (1901) ("The essential elements of due process of law are notice and
opportunity to defend."); Note, supra note 41, at 1165 (deprivations of property mandate
due process procedural requirements which include an opportunity to be heard). See gener-
ally Southern Ry. v. Virginia, 290 U.S. 190, 196 (1933) (absence of notice and opportunity
to be heard violates due process); Londoner v. Denver, 210 U.S. 373, 385 (1908) (opportu-
nity to be heard and notice of proceeding must be given in order to satisfy due process
rights).
In United States v. Crozier, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the hearing must
be within a reasonable time after the issuance of a restraining order which affects a per-
son's right to his property, in order to satisfy due process notice requirements. United
States v. Crozier, 777 F.2d 1376, 1383-84 (9th Cir. 1985). See also Armstrong v. Manzo,
380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965). The Supreme Court in Armstrong held that the due process
requirements of notice and an opportunity to be heard must both occur within a reasona-
ble time and in a reasonable manner. Id.
," See United States v. $8,850, 461 U.S 555, 562 n.12 (1983) (general rule is that hearing
must come before deprivation of property unless extraordinary circumstances exist); Fuen-
tes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 88 (1972) (previous Supreme Court cases have established that
Attorney Fee Forfeiture
quired when such deprivation encompasses an interest embraced
by the fourteenth amendment." However, in certain circum-
stances, due process will be satisfied even in the absence of a pre-
deprivation hearing.' The situation must be one in which an im-
portant public or governmental interest is at stake, and which re-
quires prompt action that is appropriately tailored to the stan-
in order to satisfy due process opportunity for hearing must be afforded before deprivation
of property takes place). Cf. Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337, 343 (1969)
(Harlan, J., concurring) (notice and hearing establish validity of underlying claim); Opp
Cotton Mills v. Administrator, 312 U.S. 126, 152-53 (1941) (no special time during which
hearing must be afforded as long as it occurs before the deprivation is effective); Note,
supra note 41, at 1165 ("due process ... protect[s] against arbitrary deprivations of prop-
erty" so chance for hearing will usually be before the defendant is deprived of his
property).
While a prior hearing can impose greater costs in time, effort, and expense, and it may
be more efficient to dispense with the opportunity for such hearings, these factors cannot
outweigh the constitutional right at stake. See Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 540-41 (1971)
(due process not intended to promote efficiency, but to promote necessary protections for
defendant); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 261 (1970) (due process is method of protec-
tion, not system of efficiency).
" US. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 1. The fourteenth amendment guarantees that no state
shall "deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law ..... Id.
The fourteenth amendment has been held to apply the fifth amendment to the states. See
Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 794 (1969) (Court found fifth amendment guarantee
against double jeopardy to be fundamental right and applied it to states through four-
teenth amendment); Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 148 (1968) ("[Mjany of the rights
guaranteed by the first eight amendments to the Constitution have been held to be pro-
tected against state action by the Due Process Clause of the fourteenth amendment.");
Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 5-7 (1964) (noting amendments one and four applied to
states through fourteenth amendment and holding that fifth amendment protection from
self-incrimination does also).
The right to a prior hearing applies only to the deprivation of an interest encompassed
within the fourteenth amendment's protection. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 332
(1976); Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 557-58 (1974) (where property interest is at
stake, Supreme Court has consistently required hearing prior to deprivation).
" See Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337, 339 (1969) (depriving a person of
property without prior opportunity to be heard may well satisfy due process requirements
in extraordinary situations); Note, supra note 41, at 1165 (extraordinary situation will al-
low for seizure of property before notice and opportunity for hearing are exercised). See,
e.g., Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 678-80 (1974) (interest of
government in holding yacht containing marijuana was extraordinary circumstance to al-
low for seizure before hearing); Ewing v. Mytinger & Casselberry, Inc., 339 U.S. 594, 599-
600 (1950) (where seizure occurs prior to hearing, as long as there is a hearing at some
point, due process will be satisfied); North Am. Cold Storage Co. v. Chicago, 211 U.S. 306,
320 (1908) (destruction of contaminated food before a preliminary hearing was not denial
of due process). See generally Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 91-92 (1972). The Court has
allowed seizure before a hearing in a number of situations including: The "collectfion of]
the internal revenue of the United States, to meet the needs of a national war effort, to
protect against economic disaster of a bank failure, and to protect the public from mis-
branded drugs and contaminated food." Id.
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dards of a narrowly drawn statute.4 Even in such a situation a
hearing must ensue soon after the deprivation. 49
The CFA satisfactorily provides for a hearing if the restraining
order is to be issued before the filing of an indictment or informa-
tion."0 If the government seeks a restraining order once the in-
dictment or information has been filed, however, no hearing is
required.51 It is submitted that where the forfeiture of attorneys'
48 Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 91 (1972). In Fuentes, the Court defined the extraordi-
nary circumstances which must exist in any one situation:
First .... the seizure has been directly necessary to secure an important governmen-
tal or general public interest. Second, there has been a special need for very prompt
action. Third, ... the person initiating the'seizure has been a government official
responsible for determining, under the standards of a narrowly drawn statute, that it
was necessary and justified in the particular instance.
Id. See also United States v. Spilotro, 680 F.2d. 612, 617 (9th Cir. 1982) (slight variation on
Fuentes criteria); Ivers v. United States, 581 F.2d 1362, 1368 (9th Cir. 1978) (Fuentes crite-
ria reiterated).
"' See Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965). Due process requires an opportu-
nity to be heard that is '-'granted at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner." Id. See
also Peralta v. Heights Medical Center, Inc., 108 S. Ct. 896, 899 (1988) (interested parties
must be given notice calculated to apprise them of action and give them an opportunity to
object); United States v. Spilotro, 680 F.2d 612, 617 (9th Cir. 1982) (once restraining or-
der has been issued hearing must be afforded within meaningful time); Vanelli v. Reynolds
School Dist. No. 7, 667 F.2d 773, 779-80 (9th Cir. 1982) (opportunity to be heard must be
at reasonable time in meaningful manner). See generally United States v. $8,850, 461 U.S.
555, 564-67 (1983). The Court employed the Barker v. Wingo test, supra note 42, to ensure
that hearing is afforded within reasonable time after seizure of property. Id.
" See supra note 39 (section 1963 (dX1XB) of Act provides that hearing will be afforded
in situations where there is pre-indictment restraint of property).
" See supra note 39 (section 1963 (d)(1)(A) of Act makes no mention of a hearing re-
quirement after indictment has been filed). Before the passing of the Comprehensive For-
feiture Act, case law analysis of the forfeiture provisions indicated that a post-indictment,
post-deprivation hearing was required by due process and thus read it into the statute. See
United States v. Thier, 801 F.2d 1463, 1466-69 (5th Cir. 1986) (applied FED. R. Civ. P. 65
requiring an adversary hearing to follow all restraining orders and injunctions issued by
United States courts), modified, 809 F.2d 249 (5th Cir. 1987); United States v. Crozier, 777
F.2d 1376, 1382-84 (9th Cir. 1985) (absence of hearing upon imposition of restraining
order violates due process); United States v. Lewis, 759 F.2d 1316, 1324-25 (8th Cir.) (ap-
plied FED. R. Civ. P. 65 requiring adversary hearing after indictment is issued), cert. denied,
474 U.S. 994, 995 (1985); United States v. Spilotro, 680 F.2d 612, 617 (9th Cir. 1982)
(due process requires that "defendant be afforded a prompt hearing once the restraining
order has been entered."); United States v. Long, 654 F.2d 911, 915 (3d Cir. 1981) (gov-
ernment must establish that defendant violated CCE and property is subject to forfeiture in
order to obtain post-indictment restraining order); United States v. Veon, 538 F. Supp.
237, 243 (E.D. Cal. 1982) (court read requirement of post-indictment hearing into statute
to avoid constitutional confrontations). But see United States v. Musson, 802 F.2d 384, 386
(10th Cir. 1986) (Congress' intent was to require hearing only when restraining order is
issued pre-indictment); United States v. Draine, 637 F. Supp. 482, 485 (S.D. Ala. 1986) (to
find that failure of statute to provide for post-indictment hearing in all cases is unconstitu-
tional is contrary to the concept of due process flexibility), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 94
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fees is implicated in a post-indictment restraining order, due pro-
cess mandates that notice and hearing be afforded to defendants.
It is suggested that the courts employ the balancing test fash-
ioned by the Supreme Court in Mathews v. Eldridge" to determine
whether, in the context of attorney fee forfeiture, a post-indict-
ment/post-restraint hearing is necessary to comply with due pro-
cess. The test consists of three factors to be balanced: 1) the pri-
vate interests at stake due to the government's action;"3 2)
whether the action being considered decreases the chance of an
erroneous outcome; 54 and 3) the government's interest in the ac-
tion.5 In the case of a RICO or CCE defendant, the private inter-
est of defendants in retaining their assets is great since forfeiture
of such assets could impact on their sixth amendment right to ob-
tain counsel of choice." Restraining a defendant's assets which
would otherwise be used for payment of attorneys' fees may pre-
vent a defendant from obtaining competent counsel, and there-
fore increases the chance of an erroneous outcome. 7
(1987).
' 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976). See Comment, supra note 42, at 224 (Mathews test of due
process requirements is readily applicable to fee forfeiture issue). Cf. Cleveland Bd. of
Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 542-43 (1985) (Court used Mathews test to determine
what process was due a defendant deprived of wages without opportunity for hearing);
Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 263-71 (1970) (Court used balancing test to determine
procedures which would insure defendant's due process rights).
" Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
84 Id.
" Id.
" See, e.g., Comment, supra note 42, at 224 (defendant risks losing all his assets and
possibly his entire estate). It is clear that the right to counsel of choice is qualified since one
of its limits is the amount of funds available to secure counsel. See United States v. Harvey,
814 F.2d 905, 923 (4th Cir. 1987) (right to counsel of one's choice "means, in general, a
right to retain private counsel of choice out of one's private resources, and up to the limit
of those resources, free of government interference."), rev'd on rehearing sub noma. United
States v. Caplin & Drysdale, 837 F.2d 637 (4th Cir. 1988); Note, supra note 35, at 1177-78
(to extent defendant can afford to pay for counsel, he has right to choice of counsel); Note,
supra note 20, at 675 ("[c]o-extensive with the defendant's right to counsel is his right to a
fair and reasonable opportunity to retain the counsel of his choice.").
If a RICO defendant stands to lose all of his money, including money with which to pay
his attorney, his right to counsel will certainly be affected. See United States v. Badala-
menti, 614 F. Supp. 194, 196 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (forfeiture of defendant's money with which
he would pay an attorney legitimate fee would be sixth amendment violation); Brickey,
supra note 1, at 496 ("For the defendant whose only assets are allegedly traceable to crimi-
nal conduct, the government's decision to seek forfeiture may have an immediate and ad-
verse impact on his ability to retain counsel of choice.").
" See Comment, supra note 42, at 224. A defendant who has money to retain his counsel
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While the government has a substantial interest in separating
the defendant from tainted funds, this interest can be furthered
without restraining the assets that are allocated to pay the defend-
ant's attorney." It is suggested that the application of the Mathews
test mandates that in order to satisfy due process, a RICO or CCE
defendant is constitutionally entitled to a post-indictment/post-
deprivation hearing. A procedure which did not require the hear-
ing would raise serious questions as to a defendant's fifth amend-
ment due process rights."
of choice enhances the reliability of the trial process because private counsel presumably
has better funding. Id. Moreover, if the defendant can choose his own counsel, the free
flow of information is likely to be greater because a defendant has more trust and confi-
dence in an attorney of his own choice. Id. at 225. While this is not to suggest that public
counsel is incompetent, the public defense bar lacks the necessary resources to effectively
handle long and complex RICO and CCE proceedings. Id. at 224-25. See also United States
v. Harvey, 814 F.2d 905, 921 (4th Cir. 1987) ("The available force of public defenders and
legal aid lawyers is insufficient to provide this assurance [that defendant has competent
counsel]."), rev'd on rehearing sub nomn. United States v. Caplin & Drysdale, 837 F.2d 637
(4th Cir. 1988). But see In re Grand Jury Subpoena Dated Jan. 2, 1985 (Payden v. United
States) 605 F. Supp. 839, 853 n.19 (S.D.N.Y.) (explicitly rejecting the Rogers court's con-
tention that appointed counsel is unable to adequately defend a RICO prosecution), rev'd
on other grounds, 767 F.2d 26 (2d Cir. 1985); United States v. Bello, 470 F. Supp. 723, 725(S.D. Cal. 1979) (defendant's sixth amendment right to counsel not violated by representa-
tion by court appointed counsel); supra note 20 (discussion of public defender's lack of
adequate resources).
" See United States v. Monsanto, 852 F.2d 1400, 1402-03 (2d Cir.) (Feinberg, C.J., con-
curring) (government's interest in claiming defendant's assets is weak in relation to defend-
ant's sixth amendment rights), cert. granted, 57 U.S.L.W. 3333 (U.S. Nov. 8, 1988) (No. 88-
454); Comment, supra note 42, at 225. The government's only interest in the forfeiture is
to separate the defendant from his tainted funds and this interest would be served whether
the assets went to the government or to a legitimately paid attorney. Id. Cf. United States
v. Veon, 538 F. Supp. 237, 248 (E.D. Cal. 1982) (government interest is separating defend-
ant from all profits and property); 1984 SENATE REPORT, supra note 1, at 191 (Congress felt
RICO defendant had to be stripped of his economic power); Taylor, Forfeiture Under 18
U.S.C. § 1963 RICO's Most Powerful Weapon, 17 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 379, 379 (1980) (Con-
gress' aim was to remove RICO defendant's economic power); Note, supra note 20, at 666
(legislature wanted to separate defendant from source of money).
"' See United States v. Monsanto, 852 F.2d 1400, 1419 (2d Cir.) (Cardamone, J., concur-
ring in part, dissenting in part) (post-indictment restraint hearing required as matter of
fifth amendment due process), cert. granted, 57 U.S.L.W. (U.S. Nov. 8, 1988) (No. 88-454);
United States v. Harvey, 814 F.2d 905, 928-29 (4th Cir. 1987) (immediate post-deprivation
hearing required by due process), rev'd on rehearing sub nom. United States v. Caplin &
Drysdale, 837 F.2d 637 (4th Cir. 1988); United States v. Thier, 801 F.2d 1463, 1466-70
(5th Cir. 1986) (employing FED. R. Civ. P. 65 requires post-deprivation hearing to comply
with due process), modified, 809 F.2d 249 (5th Cir. 1987); United States v. Crozier, 777
F.2d 1376, 1382-84 (9th Cir. 1985) (required hearing after issuance of indictment to satisfy
due process); United States v. Spilotro, 680 F.2d 612, 617 (9th Cir. 1982) (due process
requires post-indictment hearing). See also Note, supra note 35, at 1188 (in forfeiture case
where restraint of property can impinge upon defendant's sixth amendment rights, hearing
132
Attorney Fee Forfeiture
B. Due Process, Standard of Proof
Courts have differed with regard to what the government's bur-
den is at post-indictment/post-deprivation hearings." A number
of courts have determined that the government has the burden of
proof"1 to show a likelihood that a jury will believe beyond a rea-
sonable doubt that the defendant is guilty of a RICO or CCE vio-
lation and that the property in question is forfeitable under the
statute.' Other courts, however, have criticized such a standard
should be required); Note, supra note 41, at 1177 (despite contrary congressional intent,
courts have required post-indictment adversarial hearing to ensure due process for defend-
ant). But see United States v. Caplin & Drysdale, 837 F.2d 637 (4th Cir. 1988) (en banc
court reversed a circuit court panel opinion to hold that attorneys' fees were subject to
forfeiture, but made no requirement for post-indictment/post-restraint hearing); United
States v. Musson, 802 F.2d 384, 386 (10th Cir. 1986) (because Congress did not intend for
hearing in post-indictment situation, none was required); United States v. Draine, 637 F.
Supp. 482, 485 (S.D. Ala. 1986) (due process flexibility does not require hearing in all
situations of restraint), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 94 (1987).
" See infra notes 64-68 and accompanying text (discussion of government's burden at
hearing). See, e.g., United States v. Monsanto, 836 F.2d 74, 83-84 (2d Cir. 1987) (govern-
ment must prove its chance of success on merits at trial by preponderance of the evidence),
affd, F.2d 1400 (2d Cir.), cert. granted, 57 U.S.L.W. 3333 (U.S. Nov. 8, 1988) (No. 88-454);
United States v. Thier, 801 F.2d 1463, 1470 (5th Cir. 1986) (indictment itself constitutes
strong showing required at hearing); United States v. Lewis, 759 F.2d 1316, 1324 (8th
Cir.) (followed reasonable doubt standard), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 994 (1985) ; United States
v. Beckham, 562 F. Supp. 488, 490 (E.D. Mich. 1983) (required intermediate standard of
clear and convincing evidence).
' United States v. Veon, 538 F. Supp. 237, 245-46 (E.D. Cal. 1982) (at adversarial hear-
ing burden of proof rests on proponent of motion). See also United States v. Spilotro, 680
F.2d 612, 618 (9th Cir. 1982) (prosecution must show likelihood of jury convicting defend-
ant); Kouba v. Allstate Ins. Co., 523 F. Supp. 148, 154 (E.D. Cal. 1981) ("all permissible
inferences [are] properly . . . drawn . . . in favor of the non-moving party," so party making
motion has burden of proof) (quoting Ruffin v. County of Los Angeles, 607 F.2d 1276,
1279 (9th Cir. 1979)). See generally 11 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE §2948 at 429 (1975) ("movant .. .carries ... burden of persuasion"). Various
courts have uniformly held that the burden of proof rests with the government, the propo-
nent of the motion, at post-indictment hearings. United States v. Mandel, 408 F. Supp.
679, 682 (D. Md. 1976) (petitioner has burden of coming forward with substantial evidence
to show he will prevail on the merits); Note, supra note 41, at 1181-82.
61 See United States v. Long, 654 F.2d 911, 915 (3d Cir. 1981). The Court stated that:
Before a court can issue such a restraining order, however, the government must
demonstrate that it is likely to convince a jury, beyond a reasonable doubt, of two
things: one, that the defendant is guilty of violating the Continuing Criminal Enter-
prise statute [or RICO] and two, that the profits or properties at issue are subject to
forfeiture under the provisions of section 848 (a)(2) [or RICO counterpart].
Id. See also United States v. Monsanto, 836 F.2d 74 (2d Cir. 1987) (government must show
probability to convince jury that defendant has violated statute and that assets are subject
to forfeiture), affd, 852 F.2d 1400 (2d Cir.), cert. granted, 57 U.S.L.W. 3333 (U.S. Nov. 8,
1988) (No. 88-454); United States v. Lewis, 759 F.2d 1316, 1324 (8th Cir.) (standards set
out by Long used as criteria for government's standard of proof in upholding restraining
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as being uncertain and imprecise in application." At least two
courts have interpreted this "likelihood standard" as requiring a
preponderance of the evidence."
IV. A CLEAR AND CONVINCING STANDARD
A standard of preponderance of the evidence is the least bvr-
densome standard which a court can impose, indicating a case in
which society has "minimal concern for [the] outcome."' A post-
orders), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 994 (1985); Note, supra note 35, at 1190-92 (standard im-
posed upon government by Long court analyzed).
" See United States v. Beckham, 562 F. Supp. 488, 489 (E.D. Mich. 1983). The court
refused to apply the Long standard because it could not be applied with "any degree of
precision." Id. The standard was not workable because a court cannot determine how a
reasonable jury would decide. Id. at 490. See also Note, supra note 35, at 1190 n. 170 (com-
parison between Long standard and civil preliminary injunction showed that although Long
seemed nebulous, it was just as feasible for application as civil standard).
" See, e.g., United States v. Veon, 538 F. Supp. 237, 247-48 (E.D. Cal. 1982). The court
found that only a property interest would be affected, and therefore the minimum stan-
dard of preponderance of the evidence was applicable. Id. The Veon court came to this
conclusion by applying "due process standards for fundamental fairness in the selection of
the applicable burden of proof." Id. at 247 (citing Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745
(1982)).
The Veon court applied the preponderance of the evidence standard, using the three
factors used in Mathews. Veon, 538 F. Supp. at 248. See supra note 52 and accompanying
text (discussion of Mathews analysis). In balancing the three factors, the Veon court decided
that the first and third elements of the test only require the preponderance of the evidence
standard, while the second factor called for proof by clear and convincing evidence; thus
the standard of preponderance of the evidence was favored. Veon, 538 F. Supp. at 248. See
also United States v. Harvey, 560 F. Supp. 1040, 1085 (S.D. Fla. 1983) (proper standard is
preponderance of the evidence), affd, 814 F.2d 902 (4th Cir. 1987), rev'd on rehearing sub
nom. United States v. Caplin & Drysdale, 837 F.2d 637 (4th Cir. 1988). But see United
States v. Beckham, 562 F. Supp. 488, 490 (E.D. Mich. 1983) (intermediate standard of
clear and convincing evidence required).
"See Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 755 (1982). In a civil dispute over money dam-
ages, society itself is not as concerned with the outcome and the litigants should both bear
the risk of error in equal degree, so the minimal burden of preponderance of the evidence
is employed. Id. However, in a criminal case where the defendant's life or liberty is at
stake, the highest degree of proof, beyond a reasonable doubt, is employed to minimize
any chance of error. Id. See also California ex rel. Cooper v. Mitchell Brothers Santa Ana
Theater, 454 U.S. 90, 93 (1981) (recognizing three standards of proof ranging from pre-
ponderance of evidence to beyond reasonable doubt), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1093 (1982);
Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 423 (1979) (at one end of spectrum is preponderance
of the evidence when society has minimal concern, at other end, in a criminal prosecution,
more stringent standard is beyond a reasonable doubt); McBaine, Burden of Proof: Degrees
of Belief, 32 CALIF. L. REV. 242, 245-57 (1944) (analysis of three recognized types of burden
of proof from preponderance of evidence to beyond a reasonable doubt); Morano, A Reex-
amination of the Development of the Reasonable Doubt Rule, 55 B.U.L. REV. 507 (1975) (reasona-
ble doubt presents less strict standard than previous common-law rules). See generally
CLEARY, MCCORMACK ON EVIDENCE § § 339-341 at 956-64 (3d ed. 1984) (discussion of bur-
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restraint hearing incident to a RICO or CCE indictment is vital
since it can concern more than just a proprietary right." The out-
come of the hearing can affect the defendant's right to counsel.67
To require a minimal standard, such as a mere preponderance of
the evidence, reduces the pre-trial hearing to an illusory burden
on the government rather than an actual one. In contrast, a bur-
den of "proof beyond a reasonable doubt" puts the judge in the
position of determining how a reasonable jury would decide." It
is therefore suggested that the intermediate standard of clear and
convincing evidence should be used in order to balance the de-
fendant's fifth amendment due process rights and the interest of
the government in preventing the pre-trial transfer of assets.
V. MAINTAINING THE BALANCE BETWEEN THE PROSECUTION AND
THE DEFENSE
In order to satisfy due process, it is imperative that there be a
balance between an accused and his accuser.69 The Supreme
dens of proof in ascending order); Underwood, The Thumb on the Scales of Justice: Burdens of
Persuasion in Criminal Cases, 86 YALE L.J. 1299 (1977).
" See, e.g., Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 332 (1976). "Procedural due process
imposes constraints on governmental decisions which deprive individuals of 'liberty' or
.property' interests within the meaning of the Due Process Clause .... " Id. See also Wolff
v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 557-58 (1974) (due process required for property); Joint Anti-
Fascist Committee v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 168 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring)
(same).
V See Note, supra note 35, at 1188-89 (outcome of hearing may impinge on sixth amend-
ment right to choice of counsel, because choice is determined in part by defendant's
funds); Note, Attorneys' Fee Forfeiture Under the Comprehensive Forfeiture Act of 1984: Can We
Protect Against Sham Transfers to Attorneys?, 62 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 734, 743 (1987) (fi-
nances limit defendant's right to choice of counsel); Note, supra note 41, at 1184 (defend-
ant's interest in outcome of hearing which may result in restraint of assets is very strong
because ultimately choice of counsel may be affected). See also Urquhart v. Lockhart, 726
F.2d 1316, 1319 (8th Cir. 1984) (cannot deprive financially able defendant of right to
choice of counsel).
" See United States v. Beckham, 562 F. Supp. 488, 490 (E.D. Mich. 1983) (reasonable
doubt standard could not be applied because it would compel judge to decide what reason-
able jury would determine).
" See Wardius v. Oregon, 412 U.S. 470, 474 (1973) (due process clause speaks to balance
between strength of accused and accuser); Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 82 (1970) (eq-
uity in adversary system should be preserved); Note, supra note 20, at 678 ("[dlue process
requires a balance between the accused and accuser .... "). See also United States v. Rog-
ers, 602 F. Supp. 1332, 1350 (D. Colo. 1985). The Rogers court held that the mere oppor-
tunity for a prosecutor to manipulate the adversarial system was adverse to the require-
ments of due process. Id.
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Court has taken affirmative steps to insure that the criminal de-
fendant receives the same basic litigation tools as the prosecu-
tion.7 0 However, the power to forfeit attorneys' fees may lead to
an imbalance because it gives the government improper influence
over the defendant's right to counsel, 71 as well as defendant's
choice of counsel.1
Through manipulation of the forfeiture device, the government
can successfully deter private counsel from taking on RICO or
CCE cases.7 If the government chooses not to seek a restraining
"0 See, e.g., Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 83-84 (1985) (indigent allowed to secure
psychiatrist at state expense to rebut prosecutor's evidence); Little v. Streater, 452 U.S. 1,
14 (1981) (father in paternity action unable to afford blood grouping test entitled to state
sponsorship); Wardius, 412 U.S. at 475 ("[Iln the absence of a strong showing of state
interests to the contrary, discovery must be a two way street."); Williams v. Florida, 399
U.S. 78, 82 (1970) (adversary system requires that defendant have same opportunity as
state in discovery); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963) (due process requires
that criminal defendant be provided with counsel if defendant cannot afford it); Griffin v.
Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 19 (1956) (criminal defendant must be provided with trial transcript
for appeal). See generally Note, Criminal Procedure - Due Process and the Indigent Defendants:
Extending Fundamental Fairness to Include the Right to Expert Assistance, 29 How. L.J. 609
(1986) (scope of indigent defendants' due process rights).
" See United States v. Monsanto, 852 F.2d 1400, 1402 (2d Cir.) (Feinberg, C.J., concur-
ring) (government's use of forfeiture enables it to get advantage by weakening defendant's
ability to defend himself), cert. granted, 57 U.S.L.W. 3333 (U.S. Nov. 8, 1988) (No. 88-
454); Rogers, 602 F. Supp. at 1350. The court asserted that an interpretation of the statute
in a manner which would call for the forfeiture of attorneys' fees "would undermine the
very principles underlying the adversarial system." Id. If such interpretations were allowed,
the government would possess the "ultimate tactical advantage" in being able to eliminate
skilled defense attorneys. Id. The court took this position in order to prevent prosecutorial
manipulation. Id. See also Cloud, supra note 16, at 44-45 (forfeiture allows prosecution to
inhibit defendant's right to counsel); Note, supra note 20, at 677 (application of forfeiture
provision to attorney fees would leave adversarial system unbalanced).
" See Rogers, 602 F. Supp. at 1350. Allowing attorney's fees to be forfeited would give
the government the ability to decide whether a defendant will be able to be represented by
competent defense counsel. Id. See also United States v. Harvey, 814 F.2d 905, 923 (4th
Cir. 1987) (limiting defendant's funds through forfeiture would enable government to dic-
tate defendant's choice of counsel), rev'd on rehearing sub nom. United States v. Caplin &
Drysdale, 837 F.2d 637 (4th Cir. 1988); United States v. Reckmeyer, 631 F. Supp. 1191,
1197 (E.D. Va. 1986) (government's improper influence over defendant's choice of attor-
ney could result from ability of government to "include a broad list of assets allegedly
subject to forfeiture," including attorneys' fees, in indictment); Cloud, supra note 16, at 44-
45 (by asking for forfeiture on indictment, government can exclude able defense attorneys
which would most likely be attorney of defendant's choice).
" See United States v. Rogers, 602 F. Supp. 1332, 1350 (D. Colo. 1985) (seizure of attor-
neys' fees would violate criminal defendant's right to choice of counsel). The court analo-
gized the right to retain fees for an attorney to a necessity of life. Id. at 1348 n.5. Cf.
United States v. Ray, 731 F.2d 1361, 1365 (9th Cir. 1984) (restraining order for forfeiture
of assets excluded necessities of life); United States v. lanniello, 644 F. Supp. 452, 459
(S.D.N.Y. 1985) (deprivation of attorneys' assistance would be deprivation of "necessity of
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order on a defendant's assets but merely notifies the defense of
possible forfeiture upon conviction, not only will private counsel
be deterred from taking the case, " but the defendant will proba-
bly retain sufficient funds to disqualify him from receiving an ap-
pointed counsel.7 5 If the government does induce indigence upon
the defendant, qualifying him for assistance from the public bar,
the defendant may be deprived of effective assistance."6
A prosecutor may also employ his control over the grand jury7
to eliminate competent defense attorneys.75 If the defense attor-
ney is hired prior to the grand jury investigation the prosecution
can learn the identity of the defense counsel,7 9 and structure a
broad indictment attaching all of the defendant's assets, including
life"). See also Cloud, supra note 16, at 35-36 ("potential loss of their earned compensation
makes it financially impossible for attorneys to represent clients in complex and lengthy"
litigation); Note, supra note 16, at 147-48 (defendant who had already hired lawyer would
risk chance of losing representation if attorney's fee forfeiture appeared on indictment).
"' See supra notes 23 - 27 and accompanying text (discussion of forfeiture's effect in re-
pelling attorneys).
" See United States v. One Parcel of Land, 614 F. Supp. 183, 187 (N.D. 1i. 1985) (if all
competent attorneys refuse to represent RICO defendant, counsel will be appointed as
long as defendant is indigent); United States v. Badalamenti, 614 F. Supp. 194, 197
(S.D.N.Y. 1985) (defendant who has money to pay an attorney cannot apply for appointed
counsel); 18 U.S.C.A § 3006A(a) (West Supp. 1988). The Criminal Justice Act requires all
United States district courts to provide for appointed counsel when the defendant is finan-
cially unable, but not if he has assets with which to secure private counsel. Id. See generally
United States v. Jiminez, 600 F.2d 1172, 1174 (5th Cir.) (if criminal defendant is able to
pay, he is not entitled to appointed counsel), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 903 (1979); United
States v. Santarpio, 560 F.2d 448, 455 (1st Cir.) (criminal defendant may have to repay
appointed counsel if able to do so), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 984 (1977).
" See supra notes 23 - 27 and accompanying text (discussion of deficiencies in appointed
counsel).
" See Vaira, The Role of The Prosecutor Inside the Grand Jury Room: Where Is the Foul Line?,
75 J. CriM. L. AND CRIMINOLOGY 1129, 1131 (1984) (prosecutor has wide range of control
over grand jury). See also United States v. Chanen, 549 F.2d 1306, 1312 (9th Cir.) (grand
juries rely on prosecutors), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 825 (1977); In re Grand Jury Proceedings,
486 F.2d 85, 90 (3d Cir. 1973) (grand juries are part of prosecutorial arm of government).
" Cloud, supra note 16, at 45. Manipulation of the grand jury which can lead to the
exclusion of specific attorneys by the prosecution is possible. Id. This is due to the secrecy
surrounding grand jury proceedings and the strong influence of the prosecutor in these
non-adversary proceedings. Id. See Vaira, supra note 77, at 1131 n.14 (dependency rela-
tionship between prosecutor and grand jury can be used for manipulation). See, e.g., United
States v. Kilpatrick, 594 F. Supp. 1324, 1353 (D. Colo. 1984) (prosecutor's "inaccurate
procedures" turned grand jury "into little more than a rubber stamp"), rev'd, United
States v. Kilpatrick, 821 F.2d 1456 (10th Cir. 1987), cert. granted, 108 S. Ct. 693 (1988).
" See United States v. Rogers, 602 F. Supp. 1332, 1349-50 (D. Colo. 1985) (defense
counsel must be present at grand jury proceedings).
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money which would be used to pay the attorney's fee.8" Prosecu-
tors can also seek to amend indictments to cover more assets if
they wish to exclude a specific attorney after the initial indictment
has been issued. 81 Thus the threat of forfeiture of attorneys' fees
shifts the balance the Supreme Court has sought to maintain be-
tween the prosecution and the accused to the side of the prosecu-
tion.8' The prosecution has clearly been given an unfair tool with
which it can effectively exclude an adversary's counsel as it
chooses. Courts which continue to follow this path may seriously
infringe upon defendants' due process rights.
CONCLUSION
To resolve the inconsistencies among the circuits in their appli-
cation of the forfeiture provisions of RICO and CCE, it is essen-
tial that they be construed as providing for an exemption of attor-
neys' fees. A defendant's sixth amendment right to counsel in
such complex litigation is fundamental. Due to caseload and the
lack of financial resources, a public defenders' office would be in-
capable of offering effective assistance in such complex litigation.
Additionally, it is unlikely that competent counsel will be attracted
by CJA rates.
The ethical violations that may arise from the potential forfei-
ture outweigh the government's interest in protecting the insignif-
icant amount of assets allocated to legal fees. It is unfair to con-
tinue to compel attorneys to choose between refusing to take a
case and the possibility of ethical conflicts arising.
In order to comply with the due process requirements, it is im-
perative that the RICO and CCE statutes provide defendants with
an opportunity for a hearing once an indictment requesting for-
feiture of attorneys' fees has been issued. At this hearing, it is also
in keeping with due process to require the government to prove
" See Vaira, supra note 77, at 1131 (influence of prosecutor over grand jury enables him
to structure indictment); Cloud, supra note 16, at 45 (prosecutor can turn to grand jury
when he wants to amend indictment so that it says exactly what prosecutor wants).
81 Cloud, supra note 16, at 35 (prosecution can weigh its decision to attach all defend-
ant's assets for forfeiture).
" See United States v. Monsanto, 852 F.2d 1400, 1405 (2d Cir.) (Oakes, J., concurring)
(statute allowing attorney fee forfeiture permits prosecutor to undermine adversarial pro-
cess), cert. granted, 57 U.S.L.W. 3333 (U.S. Nov. 8, 1988) (No. 88-454).
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the likelihood of the defendant's guilt by clear and convincing evi-
dence in order to allow the defendant to retain his assets, to pay
an attorney of his choice and to preserve the balance of the adver-
sarial system.
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